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Abstract
Background: Ebola haemorrhagic fever (EHF) is infamous for its high case-fatality proportion (CFP) and the ease
with which it spreads among contacts of the diseased. We describe the course of the EHF outbreak in Masindi,
Uganda, in the year 2000, and report on response activities.
Methods: We analysed surveillance records, hospital statistics, and our own observations during response activities.
We used Fisher’s exact tests for differences in proportions, t-tests for differences in means, and logistic regression
for multivariable analysis.
Results: The response to the outbreak consisted of surveillance, case management, logistics and public
mobilisation. Twenty-six EHF cases (24 laboratory confirmed, two probable) occurred between October 21st and
December 22nd, 2000. CFP was 69% (18/26). Nosocomial transmission to the index case occurred in Lacor hospital
in Gulu, outside the Ebola ward. After returning home to Masindi district the index case became the origin of a
transmission chain within her own extended family (18 further cases), from index family members to health care
workers (HCWs, 6 cases), and from HCWs to their household contacts (1 case). Five out of six occupational cases of
EHF in HCWs occurred after the introduction of barrier nursing, probably due to breaches of barrier nursing
principles. CFP was initially very high (76%) but decreased (20%) due to better case management after reinforcing
the response team. The mobilisation of the community for the response efforts was challenging at the beginning,
when fear, panic and mistrust had to be countered by the response team.
Conclusions: Large scale transmission in the community beyond the index family was prevented by early case
identification and isolation as well as quarantine imposed by the community. The high number of occupational
EHF after implementing barrier nursing points at the need to strengthen training and supervision of local HCWs.
The difference in CFP before and after reinforcing the response team together with observations on the ward
suggest a critical role for intensive supportive treatment. Collecting high quality clinical data is a priority for future
outbreaks in order to identify the best possible FHF treatment regime under field conditions.
Background
Since its discovery 1976 in Nzara and Maridi, Sudan [1],
the Sudan ebolavirus (SEBOV) has caused three further
epidemics in humans: Nzara, Sudan, 1979 [2], Gulu,
Mbarara and Masindi, Uganda 2000 [3-5], and Yambio,
Sudan, 2004 [6]. The reservoir of SEBOV and the mode
of primary transmission to man are unknown. Second-
ary spread occurs through direct contact with infected
patients, their body fluids or remains.
The 2000 Ebola haemorrhagic fever (EHF) outbreak in
Uganda was first recognised on 8 October by the health
authorities of Gulu district [4]. A national and interna-
tional response was swiftly organised. On two occasions,
infected individuals travelled from Gulu to other
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outbreaks: in Mbarara (5 cases), 620 km south of Gulu
[7,8], and in Masindi (26 cases), 170 km south of Gulu.
I nJ a n u a r y2 0 0 1 ,t h eo u t b r e a k ’s final case was detected
in Gulu [9]. With a total of 425 cases, the EHF outbreak
in Uganda in 2000-2001 is the largest described to date
[3-5].
This paper focuses on the secondary EHF outbreak in
Masindi district. We describe the course of the out-
break, report on response activities, and attempt to
appreciate strengths and weaknesses of the outbreak
response. Albeit limited in the number of infected indi-
viduals, the outbreak control measures were met by a
number of significant challenges, which merit scrutiny
for improving future efforts.
Setting and methods
Setting
Masindi district is a rural district with a population of
400,000 at the time of the outbreak; agriculture and
sugar industry are its main economic activities. Masindi
town (Figure 1), the district’s administrative centre, had
at that time a population of 25,000. The main road from
Uganda’s capital Kampala to the country’sn o r t h e r nd i s -
tricts traverses the district but not Masindi town.
Masindi district is characterised by its ethnic diversity:
the population consists of 56 ethnic groups, of which
the Banyoro and the Bagungu together form a 60%
majority. Immigrants and refugees from neighbouring
countries have settled in this region for decades. As
elsewhere in Uganda, the five-tier local government
structure consists of elected Local Councils, headed by a
chairman.
The governmental health system of Masindi district is
headed by the District Director of Health Services
(DDHS) in Masindi town. The district has 37 health
centres and two hospitals: Masindi hospital (78 beds)
and Kiryandongo hospital (104 beds). Kiryandongo hos-
pital has more beds but is less well equipped, staffed
and frequented.
Data sources and methods
We analysed surveillance records, hospital statistics and
our own observations during response activities. While
some clinical data could be extracted from surveillance
records, clinical dossiers of individual patients were not
available for analysis. We used two-sided Fisher’se x a c t
tests for differences in proportions, two-sided t-tests for
differences in means, and logistic regression for multi-
variable analysis.
The National Task Force for the Gulu Ebola Outbreak
authorised data collection and publication. No additional
Figure 1 Gulu, Masindi and Mbarara in Uganda. The map shows the location of the epicentrum (Gulu) of the EHF outbreak in Uganda, 2000,
and of the locations were satellite outbreaks occurred (Masindi, Mbarara).
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lected routinely in an emergency situation. Patients,
relatives and health care workers were informed that a
report would be published, and that their privacy would
be respected. Permission to use the data for publication
w a sg r a n t e db yt h eM i n i s t r yo fH e a l t h ,w h o s el o c a l
representatives at the time are among the co-authors of
this paper.
Results
Onset of the outbreak
On October 27, 2000, a representative of the local gov-
ernment notified the sub-district health office of a sus-
pected EHF death. The individual, a woman in her
sixties, had been treated in St. Mary’sH o s p i t a lL a c o ri n
Gulu for an unrelated chronic condition but had left the
hospital and returned home to Kaduku II hamlet,
Masindi district, after one of the nurses, who had trea-
ted her in Lacor Hospital, had died from EHF. The
woman reportedly fell ill on October 21st and died at
home on October 25. Her extended family, including
relatives from Kenya, and many neighbours attended her
funeral.
On November 7, the sub-district office received infor-
mation that two further members of the same family
had died. The next day, the medical superintendent of
Kiryandongo hospital visited the family and found that
her three-week-old grandson and a thirty-year-old
daughter had died some days before, and that her 70-
year-old husband was ill with symptoms compatible
with EHF. The husband was transferred to Kiryandongo
hospital, placed in isolation, and had a blood sample
taken. EHF was confirmed on November 12. This is
when the District Task Force was established, and
national and international resources were mobilised to
respond to the outbreak.
Outbreak response
Co-ordination
The outbreak response was co-ordinated locally by the
District Response Task Force, presided by the Chairman
of the Local Council at district level. The Task Force
met twice weekly and united all concerned sectors of
the society with representatives from international orga-
nisations and foreign institutions involved in the
response. The Task Force’s technical committee, led by
the DDHS, consisted of local, national and international
experts on surveillance, case management, logistics and
public mobilisation. It met daily, reporting on activities
and their outcomes, establishing up-to-date case lists,
providing cumulative figures of cases and deaths to the
Ministry of Health (MoH) and planning for the follow-
ing day. Subcommittees for surveillance, case manage-
ment, logistics and public mobilisation planned and
implemented the daily activities. Although time-con-
suming, these daily meetings played a crucial role in
ensuring that all response aspects were covered while
avoiding the duplication of efforts, and in fostering
mutual trust and confidence among intervening
partners.
Case definitions
The four case definitions developed and employed in
Gulu were also applied in Masindi. Each definition
served a specific group of individuals to take a specific
decision (Table 1). From ‘alert’ via ‘suspect’ and ‘prob-
able’ to ‘confirmed’, specificity increased at the cost of
Table 1 Ebola haemorrhagic fever case definitions, Masindi/Uganda 2000
Term Used by To decide on Criteria
Alert case Community members, health care
workers not directly involved in EHF
response
Alert mobile surveillance
team?
A1 Any person with sudden onset of fever
A2 Any person with haemorrhage
A3 Any sudden death
Suspect
case
Mobile surveillance team Transport to hospital? S1 Any person who [had slept in the same house as a case, or had
touched the body of a case (dead or alive), or had touched linens
or body fluids of a case] AND has fever
S2 Any person who has at least three of the following symptoms:
[headache, nausea/vomiting, loss of appetite, diarrhoea, intense
fatigue, abdominal pain, muscle or joint pain, difficulty with
swallowing, difficulty with breathing, hiccup] AND has fever
S3 Any person with any of the following symptoms:
bleeding gums, bleeding into the eyes, bleeding into the skin,
black or bloody stool, bloody vomit, nose bleed
Probable
case
Clinicians of isolation unit Isolate patient and take
blood sample for EHF
testing?
As for suspect case, plus not explicitly defined clinical criteria for
differential diagnoses
Confirmed
case
Clinicians of isolation unit Transfer patient to
confirmed case section
within Ebola ward?
C1 A probable case with a positive Ebola antigen capture ELISA or
PCR
C2 A probable case with prior contact to another confirmed case
and positive for anti-Ebola IgG ELISA
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sensitive because of the detrimental consequences of not
identifying an EHF patient.
A ‘suspect case’ was an individual with a combination
of certain symptoms and exposures (Table 1, case defi-
nitions S1-3). A suspect case for whom an experienced
clinician has ruled out alternative diagnoses was classi-
fied as ‘probable case’.A‘laboratory-confirmed case’ was
ap r o b a b l ec a s ew i t hap o s i t i ve antigen-capture ELISA
or PCR result (Table 1, C1) [10], or a probable case
with prior contact to another confirmed case and a posi-
tive IgG ELISA result (Table 1, C2) [11]. IgM ELISA
was attempted but results were not available during the
outbreak in Masindi. Laboratory tests were performed in
the CDC field laboratory in Gulu. Samples reached that
laboratory usually within 24 h, and results were received
mostly within 48 h.
Surveillance
Members of the public reported alert cases to the near-
est health facility or the local government representative,
who forwarded the alert to the District Health Office.
Alerts were recorded in a “rumour registry”,a n d
responded to by members of the District’s mobile sur-
veillance team, who had been trained to investigate
alerts, follow-up contacts, and recognise suspect cases of
EHF. Any individual corresponding to the suspect case
definition was transported by ambulance to Masindi
hospital under barrier nursing precautions. All contacts
(anyone having had physical contact with a suspect case
or his remains, body fluids or soiled materials, or having
lived in the same house as the case) were registered by
the surveillance team and followed-up daily for 21 days,
or until the suspect case was declared a non-case follow-
ing negative clinical assessment or laboratory results.
In the vicinity of Masindi town, up to five teams of
surveillance officers moved around in pairs on motor-
bikes, while farther away teams of four officers plus dri-
ver used a four-wheel drive vehicle. Teams were
composed in such a way that at least one senior officer
was present in each team. Their case identification deci-
sions and activities were discussed with a local supervi-
sor in daily surveillance sub-committee meetings. For
communication with the District Health Office about
alerts and transports to the hospital, very high frequency
radio and cellular telephone were used.
Case management
At Masindi hospital, neither an isolation ward nor an
unused ward were available. A general ward was there-
fore evacuated to be used exclusively for probable and
confirmed EHF patients. When the number of EHF
cases increased, a second general ward was incorporated
in the extended Ebola ward.
On arrival at Masindi hospital, a suspect case was
brought to the screening area, established in a tent in
front of the Ebola ward, where an experienced physician
clinically assessed the individual. Based on interview and
physical examination, the patient was either classified as
‘probable case’ and admitted to the probable case sec-
tion of the Ebola ward (Figure 2), or as ‘non-case’ and
admitted to the general ward for further diagnosis and
treatment. Because of limited laboratory capacity only
probable cases had a blood sample taken and sent to
the temporary BSL 4 laboratory in Gulu for EHF
diagnostics.
Due to space constraints of the ward, several patients
were often hospitalised in the same room. Hospital staff
were instructed to disinfect equipment and their gloves
with 0.05% chlorine solution between contacting one
patient and the next. Movements of the patients them-
selves, however, could not always be controlled. To
further reduce the risk of transmission of SEBOV from
a confirmed case to a probable case who would later
turn out to be negative, probable and confirmed cases
were kept in separate sections of the ward.
Hospital staff wore personal protective equipment
(PPE) when caring for suspect, probable or confirmed
cases; there was a strictly defined sequence of donning
and removal of PPE according to WHO guidelines [12].
Staff moving from high to low risk areas stepped into a
0.5% chlorine foot bath, then disinfected and removed
their PPE. Medical treatment was supportive and con-
sisted of oral rehydration, analgesics and sedative drugs,
and occasionally intravenous fluid replacement. Burials
of deceased patients were undertaken using barrier nur-
sing conditions. Traditional practices that involved
direct contact with the corpse (washing the body etc.),
were suspended throughout the outbreak.
Public mobilisation
Public mobilisation involved a variety of approaches. For
addressing the communities, the support of the chairmen
of local councils at sub-district and village level was sought
and granted. Meetings with local council members and
religious leaders were held prior to the public mobilisation
teams directly addressing the community. Communication
strategies for the community included speeches at local
gatherings - sometimes specially convened, e.g. for tradi-
tional healers, sometimes making use of gatherings that
served other purposes, e.g. religious services, video screen-
ings, drama groups, radio spots, newspaper articles, pos-
ters and pamphlets. Red Cross volunteers undertook
house-to-house mobilisation.
Course of the epidemic
The first 2 weeks of the epidemic in Masindi were rela-
tively calm, the situation apparently under control, and
the first team of international experts prepared to return
to Gulu where the epidemic was still very active.
Towards the end of November the situation in Masindi
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reinforced on December 7 by a delegation of interna-
tional experts and experienced national HCWs from
Gulu.
On 19 November 2000, 1 week after the outbreak had
been declared, patients started to be admitted to the
Ebola ward at Masindi hospital. All except the first
three cases (n = 23) were treated in the Ebola ward of
Masindi Hospital. The first death in the Ebola ward
occurred on 24 November. Initially the work on Ebola
ward suffered from staff shortage and low staff reten-
tion. The situation improved when the Masindi team
was reinforced by HCWs from Gulu with significant
experience working on Ebola response there.
The EHF epidemic in Masindi district lasted 2
months, from the index case’so n s e to fd i s e a s eo n
October 21st until the death of the last case on
December 22nd (Figure 3). The official total number
of cases was 27. During a follow-up visit, however,
index family members unanimously stated that one
unconfirmed case, a three-week-old infant, had never
been in contact with any infected individual. We there-
fore consider this death to be coincidental, and
removed the infant from the case list. The reviewed
total of cases is therefore 26. All except the index case
and one of the two 2nd generation cases are laboratory
confirmed (n = 24). The district was declared Ebola
free on 25 January 2001, 42 days (i.e., double the maxi-
mum incubation period) following the confirmation of
EHF in the last case.
Case characteristics
In total, almost 200 individuals were placed under sur-
veillance as contacts of EHF cases. Fifty-two suspect
cases (Table 1) were identified by surveillance teams.
Eight were deceased; two of these were subsequently
classified as probable cases by epidemiological criteria.
The 44 living suspect cases were transported to the
Masindi Ebola ward and assessed by experienced physi-
cians. Twenty-nine of them were classified as probable
FB: Chlorine footbath Staff move in both directions
Door
Staff move in one direction
staff        Nurse        confirmed case       confirmed case
latrine      room                room                       room
store    changing     probable case           probable case
room              room                        room
Laundry
Chlorine     
making
Latrine bath Latrine bath
Medical waste
pit
staff entrance
FB
FB
car entrance
confirmed case
area
probable case
area
LOW RISK
HIGH RISK
HIGH RISK
HIGH RISK
LOW RISK
LOW RISK
HIGH RISK HIGH RISK
HIGH RISK HIGH RISK
LOW RISK
guard's hut
Figure 2 Ebola Ward, Masindi General Hospital (before extension). The Ebola ward in Masindi corresponds to the typical set-up of FHF
isolation wards consisting of three separate compartments: low risk for staff, storage; high risk for probable cases; high risk for confirmed cases;
decontamination stations between compartments.
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ing in Gulu, which returned 24 positive results. Fifteen
living suspect cases were considered as non-cases by
experienced clinicians and treated according to their
alternative diagnosis; eight of these, although not fulfill-
ing the criteria of probable cases, had a blood sample
taken without being isolated, which constituted a breach
of the official policy. All eight had negative laboratory
results.
The age of confirmed and probable cases (n = 26) ran-
ged from 2 to 70 years, with a median of 27.5 years.
Two thirds of the cases were male. In confirmed cases,
the most common general symptoms at admission were
fever (88%), loss of appetite (88%), intense fatigue (75%)
and headache (71%); of hemorrhagic symptoms, only
bleeding gums was present at admission (4.2%). The
mean stay on the Ebola ward was 6.1 days for fatal cases
(ranging from 2 to 13 days), 8.0 for survivors (2 to 11).
Patients who turned out to be non-cases stayed on aver-
age 3.3 days on the Ebola ward.
Transmission
The index case was likely infected from a HCW in
Lacor hospital in Gulu. After returning home to Masindi
district the index case became the origin of a transmis-
s i o nc h a i nw i t h i nh e ro w ne x t e n d e df a m i l y( 1 8f u r t h e r
cases), from index family members to Masindi HCWs (6
cases), and from Masindi HCWs to their household
contacts (1 case, Figure 4).
Transmission within the index family
The 73 members of the extended index family, who had
immigrated from Kenya decades before the outbreak,
lived in Kaduku II, a hamlet scattered over an area of
about 2 ha, intertwined with two unrelated households
(Figure 5), close to Kaduku village. While these neigh-
bours remained unharmed, several members of the
extended family became infected, corresponding prob-
ably to 5 epidemiological generations of cases (Figure 4).
In Figure 6, EHF cases and victims are plotted in the
family tree. Both members of the founding generation
died. The 2nd genealogical generation lost almost half
of its members (8/19), leaving 4 full and 26 half orphans
in school age or younger behind (< 15 years). The over-
all attack rate in the index family was 26% (19/73), but
in the economically most active age group of 15 to 49
years, the attack rate was 53% (16/30). CFP in the index
family was high (79%; 15/19). Because of multiple simul-
taneous contacts, transmission chains within the index
family could not comprehensively established, but con-
tact histories suggested the existence of a super-spreader
by multiple contacts: of three male adult third genera-
tion cases, one could be associated with transmissions
to ten 4th generation cases, while the others were asso-
ciated with one or two or transmissions only.
26 Ebola cases, 
2 probable, 24 confirmed; 
18 deaths, 8 survivals
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Figure 3 EHF outbreak, Masindi district, Uganda, 2000. The graph shows the number of laboratory confirmed Ebola cases over the course of
the outbreak. Fatal and non-fatal cases are indicated.
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During the first days of the EHF epidemic, before it was
recognised and declared as such, the index family had
normal everyday contacts with their neighbours.
Furthermore, the burials of two individuals, carried out
in the traditional manner before declaration of the epi-
demic, attracted a large number of neighbours, plus
further family members from near and far, including a
delegation from Kenya. Among neighbours and family
members who immediately returned home after these
burials, no suspect cases were detected by the surveil-
lance teams in Masindi district and in Kenya during the
3-weeks follow-up.
After the EHF outbreak was declared in Masindi, the
index family’s autochthonous neighbours imposed a
quarantine on the family, whose members were no
longer allowed to leave the compound (Figure 5) except
to fetch water. The health authorities accepted this
quarantine as a contribution to contain the outbreak, as
it reduced the number of contacts and concentrated
them geographically; daily follow-up was thus logistically
less demanding. During quarantine, the surveillance
team observed only few movements on their daily visits
between the index family’s settlement and the
neighbouring communities. No EHF cases were recog-
nised in the communities surrounding the index family.
The only community EHF case outside the index
family occurred in a housemaid working and giving nur-
sing care in a HCW’s household. This HCW had
acquired EHF on the Ebola ward, had refused hospitali-
sation for a couple of days, and survived; the housemaid
later died of EHF in the Ebola ward.
Occupational transmission to health care workers
Before the Masindi EHF outbreak was recognised, sev-
eral index family members attended the local health
centre in Kaduku village, where one of the nurses
became infected (Figure 4). This was the only case of
occupational EHF before barrier nursing procedures
were introduced. Five more HCWs, however, all mem-
bers of the EHF case management team, became
infected after the declaration of the outbreak and the
introduction of barrier nursing. The likely cause for
these occupational EHF cases were violations of barrier
nursing principles. According to fellow HCWs, such vio-
lations included: cleaning the ambulance without full
protective gear after transporting suspect cases and
smoking while doing so, washing soiled linen of patients
without full protective gear on the Ebola ward, or
Schematic spread of Ebola 
virus in Masindi district
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Figure 4 Spread of Ebola virus in Masindi district, Uganda, 2000. The graph shows the schematic spread of EBOV from the epicentre in
Gulu to Masindi district, within the index family (five epidemiological gernerations of cases), to HCWs before and after the introduction of barrier
nursing, and into the general population. Sex of the case and outcome of the disease are indicated.
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Page 7 of 17answering the mobile phone while working in the con-
taminated section of the Ebola ward.
Nosocomial transmission
Beyond the above mentioned likely nosocomial trans-
mission from a HCW in Gulu to the index case,
nosocomial transmission likely also occurred in the
Masindi Ebola ward, where a 2 years old child became
infected after close contact with its hospitalised and
infected mother; based on dates of onset, transmission
Homesteads of index family, Kaduku 2
fatal case
BN
ca. 500 m: AM 2 100ms u r v ivor
AM 1
GA, founder of the settlement
AW
DA
FM
SK
(neighbours)
EO
RN
PL
BN
AM1 ca. 500 m: AM  100m
fatal 
survivor
GA, founder of the settlement
AW
DA
FM
RN
AM,
neighbours, 
homestead
temporarily 
abandoned
EO
SK,
neighbours
PL
ca. 3 km:
Kaduku
Trading 
Centre
footpath
Figure 5 Homesteads of index family, Kaduku II hamlet, Masindi district, Uganda, 2000. The schematic map shows the locations of the
index family’s homesteads, with footpaths connecting them, and approximate distances between them. Fatal and survived cases are indicated.
No cases occurred in homesteads not belonging to the index family.
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out but appears less likely.
Performance of surveillance activities
Since no cases were observed outside community con-
tacts under surveillance or HCWs, the alert case defini-
tion (Table 1) did not play a major role for the
outbreak’s containment. Table 2 summarises the pre-
sence of criteria for suspect cases in individuals classi-
fied by clinicians as probable or non-cases, as well as
sensitivity and specificity of all criteria and different
combinations, as well as the equivalent information for
probable cases, classified by the CDC field laboratory in
Gulu as confirmed or non-cases. In Masindi, where
transmission occurred exclusively among identified con-
tacts, it was desirable that the epidemiological/clinical
case definition S1, which required contact plus fever
only, was sufficient to identify all probable cases.
Twenty-five out of 28 probable cases following the
index case were identified through this case definition;
case definitions S2 (at least three general symptoms plus
fever) or S3 (any bleeding sign) did not add a single
probable case. The combined case definition S (= S1 or
S2 or S3) had thus a sensitivity of 89%, but a specificity
of 7% only. Three individuals failed to fulfil the suspect
case definition because they reported neither fever nor
bleeding. The surveillance team, however, overruled the
case definition on the basis of the individuals’ prior con-
tact to an EHF case and presentation of three to seven
general symptoms. These individuals were judged by
clinicians to be probable cases and were later identified
as confirmed ones. One has to bear in mind, though,
that most cases came from one extended family, so that
HCWs using the case definition on its members had the
benefit of an increased prior probability, which likely
made the case definition more efficacious than in an
outbreak with many transmission chains of unknown
origin.
Since all patients who were clinically assessed origi-
nated from contacts under surveillance or from
HCWs, they should have been assessed on the date of
onset or the following day. For calculating the delay
between disease onset and clinical assessment we used
as date of assessment either the date of admission or
the date of first blood sample taken, whatever was the
earlier date (Table 3). The mean delay for all 35
patients who were clinically assessed was 2.0 days, ran-
ging from 0 to 8 days, the mean delay in 22 commu-
nity cases (1.7 days) being shorter than in 13 HCW
cases (2.6; p = 0.13, two-sided t-test). Only 37% (13/
35) of patients were assessed on the day of onset or
the next day as it would have been appropriate; 40%
(14/35) were hospitalised on the 2nd day after onset,
which may be considered acceptable, but for 23% (8/
35) the delay was prolonged (≥ 3 days). Extreme delays
(5 to 8 days) occurred in 3/13 HCW cases (23%), but
did not occur in community cases (p =0 . 0 4 4 ,t w o -
sided Fisher’s exact test). Causes for prolonged delays
Figure 6 EHF cases in family tree of index family, Masindi district, Uganda, 2000. The graph shows the three genealogical generations of
the index family, indicating sex, EBOV infection and EHF outcome. Attack rates per generation and in total are presented.
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community cases, missed daily visits by the surveil-
lance teams and insufficient transport capacity, and, in
both community and HCW cases, lack of cooperation
by the individuals being followed-up, i.e. refusal to
report symptoms or be taken to the hospital, as a
result of fear or mistrust of the response team.
Case fatality
The CFP in laboratory confirmed cases treated in
Masindi for EHF was 64% (14/22), compared with 100%
(4/4) in those who were not treated at Masindi Ebola
ward (p = 0.28, Fisher’s exact test, two-sided). Of the 22
confirmed EHF cases treated in Masindi for EHF, 15
were index family members, 6 were HCW who attracted
EHF during work and thus were cases of occupational
Ebola, and 1 HCW, not member of the response team,
attracted EHF while caring for a diseased colleague at
home.
Seventeen confirmed cases (15 community and two
HCW cases) were treated entirely (n = 14) or mostly (n
= 3) before the Masindi team was reinforced on Decem-
ber 7 (Figure 7). Five confirmed cases were treated
entirely (n = 3) or mostly (n = 2) after reinforcement,
all of them HCW cases (one non-occupational). The
CFP in the first phase, prior to reinforcement, was 76%
Table 2 Symptoms in suspect EHF cases by result of clinician’s assessment, and in probable EHF cases by result of
laboratory investigation
Clinicians’ assessment of
suspect cases, n = 44*
Laboratory investigation of
probable cases, n = 37
Probable, n =
29*
Non-cases, n =
15
Confirmed, n =
24
Non-cases, n =
13*
Criteria + - Se.
# + - Sp.
§ + - Se.
# + - Sp.
§
prior contact 28 1 97% 12 3 20% 24 0 100% 10 3 23%
fever 25 3 89% 13 2 13% 21 3 88% 11 1 8%
General signs: headache 20 8 71% 9 6 40% 17 7 71% 8 4 33%
nausea/vomiting 11 17 39% 6 9 60% 10 14 42% 5 7 58%
loss of appetite 22 6 79% 9 6 40% 21 3 88% 6 6 50%
diarrhoea 11 17 39% 3 12 80% 11 13 46% 2 10 83%
intense fatigue 19 9 68% 9 6 40% 18 6 75% 7 5 42%
abdominal pain 17 11 61% 6 9 60% 15 9 63% 6 6 50%
muscle or joint pain 13 15 46% 7 8 53% 13 11 54% 4 8 67%
difficulty with swallowing 7 21 25% 1 14 93% 7 17 29% 1 11 92%
difficulty with breathing 5 23 18% 0 15 100% 5 19 21% 0 12 100%
hiccup 1 27 4% 1 14 93% 0 24 0% 2 10 83%
Bleeding signs: bleeding gums 1 27 4% 0 15 100% 1 23 4% 0 12 100%
bleeding into the eyes 0 28 0% 0 15 100% 0 24 0% 0 12 100%
bleeding into the skin 0 28 0% 0 15 100% 0 24 0% 0 12 100%
black or bloody stool 1 27 4% 1 14 93% 0 24 0% 2 10 83%
bloody vomit 0 28 0% 3 12 80% 0 24 0% 1 11 92%
nose bleed 1 28 3% 0 15 100% 0 24 0% 1 12 92%
Case definitions:
S1 contact plus fever 25 3 89% 11 4 27% 21 3 88% 10 2 17%
S2 at least three general symptoms plus fever 21 7 75% 7 8 53% 19 5 79% 5 7 58%
S3 any bleeding sign 3 26 10% 4 11 73% 1 23 4% 4 9 69%
S2 or S3 any clinical case definition 21 7 75% 9 6 40% 19 5 79% 6 6 50%
S = S1 or S2 or S3: any suspect case definition 25 3 89% 14 1 7% 21 3 88% 12 0 0%
P = S1 or S2 or S3 plus clin.ass. probable = any suspect case definition
plus clinical assessment
24 0 100% 5 8 62%
Alternative case def.:
$
S1a contact plus (fever or 3+ general symptoms) 24 0 100% 10 2 17%
S2a fever plus 2+ general symptoms 21 3 88% 9 3 25%
S2b 3+ general symptoms 22 2 92% 6 6 50%
S2c 2+ general symptoms 24 0 100% 10 2 17%
*: n < 29 due to missing clinical data for index case.
#: Sensitivity.
§: Specificity.
$: Alternative case definitions, not used during outbreak
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Page 10 of 17(13/17), and 20% (1/5) in the second phase (p = 0.039,
Fisher’s exact test, two-sided). Through logistic regres-
sion we found that the association between outbreak
phase and survival persisted when controlling for age
and sex (crude OR = 13, [95% CI 1.11-152]; adjusted
OR = 16, [1.07-241]). The CFP was lower among
patients with occupational EHF (33% [2/6]) than in non-
occupational EHF (75% [12/16], p = 0.14), and lower in
HCW cases than in community cases (43% [3/7] vs. 73%
[11/15], p = 0.34).
Burials
Safe burials were provided to all fatal cases from the
Ebola ward. In Masindi, the morgue was initially not
made available for the Ebola ward, as it was feared that
this could create panic in dwellers of a settlement at 50
m distance, so that corpses remained on the ward until
burial. This changed only after the arrival of the reinfor-
cement from Gulu on December 7, when it was even-
tually accepted that corpses must be removed from the
ward, and be taken to the morgue or be buried not later
than on the day following the day of death.
Until December 4, safe burials were conducted in a
reasonably timely fashion. On December 5 and 6, staff
and community volunteers abandoned their work and
four patients died within 2 days, so that a backlog of
corpses built up on the Ebola ward. Before reinforce-
ment from Gulu, 6/11 burials took place after an unac-
ceptable delay, three of them on the 2nd day after
death, the others on the 3rd day. After the arrival of
reinforcement from Gulu, all three burials were carried
out with acceptable delay.
To facilitate the mourning process and following good
practice [13,14], Ebola victims were preferably buried
close their families’ homes. Adverse community
reactions, however, forced the health authorities bury
some victims on hospital grounds.
Participant observations and discussion
Analysing surveillance records and hospital statistics
allowed us to identify achievements and challenges in
the EHF outbreak response activities in Masindi district.
Achievements
With a single exception due to a HCW’s refusal to be
hospitalised, SEBOV did not invade the community at
large (Figure 4). Instead, the outbreak at community
level was limited to the extended family of the index
case. The outbreak response efforts have, in all likeli-
hood, significantly contributed to this containment. The
acclaim for this should be shared between the outbreak
response team for its vigorous efforts to trace cases and
follow up contacts, and the community for imposing a
quarantine on the index family. In our experience, inter-
national experts are usually reluctant to recommend
quarantine measures, being concerned by human rights
issues, fearing to antagonise the quarantined commu-
nity, and arguing that quarantine is difficult to enforce.
However, when the community itself imposes quaran-
tine, its effectiveness may be more straightforward to
ensure. Somewhat reluctantly the response team
endorsed the quarantine, knowing that it would be diffi-
cult to convince the community to give it up, and hop-
ing that it would not only decrease social mixing and
exposure of susceptible individuals to SEBOV, but also
reduce conflicts between the index family and their
autochthonous neighbours. Surveillance officers con-
vinced the community to allow the family to fetch water
from the nearest well outside the family’sc o m p o u n d ,
and made the quarantine more acceptable to the index
Table 3 Delays between onset and clinical assessment, and between admission to hospital and day of first blood
sample, by professional background of patients
Professional background of patients
Community member Health Care Worker total p-value
Delay “onset of disease - clinical assessment” (days) 0-1 9 41% 4 31% 13 37%
29 41% 5 38% 14 40%
3-4 4 18% 1 8% 5 14%
5 or more 0 0% 3 23% 3 9%
Total 22 100% 13 100% 35 100% *0.044
mean 1.7 2.6 2.0
Delay “admission to hospital - 1st blood sample taken” (days) < 0 (before admission) 2 10% 5 63% 7 25% **0.13
0-1 14 70% 2 25% 16 57%
2 3 15% 0 0% 3 11%
3 or more 1 5% 1 13% 2 7%
total 20 100% 8 100% 28 100% *0.009
*: Fisher exact test, two-sided, testing for an overall difference in proportions; **: unpaired t-test, two-sided, testing for a difference in means.
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Page 11 of 17family by providing food and supplies, which the family
members were prevented from purchasing at Kaduku
Trading Centre. Far from advocating community
imposed quarantine as a standard outbreak response
strategy, we acknowledge that in this specific outbreak it
appeared to be effective in preventing the spread of
SEBOV into the community at large, and in defusing
tensions between the affected family and its neighbours.
A related achievement was the avoidance of transmis-
sion chains of unknown origin. While transmission
could not always be prevented, when it occurred it was
at least immediately clear where it had originated: all
cases came from the population of contacts under sur-
veillance. The absence of unknown contacts makes sur-
veillance much easier, as the many cases of acute febrile
illnesses without prior contact and without more speci-
fic symptoms are then unlikely to be EHF cases. This
saves resources, and avoids feelings of being overpow-
ered by the epidemic.
African traditions are likely to have prevented trans-
mission to young children in the index family (Figure 6),
the only paediatric EHF case probably originating on the
Ebola ward. As described for other filoviral haemorrha-
gic fever (FHF) outbreaks, the tradition to keep young
children away from ill family members seems to have
protected the children from transmission of SEBOV
[15-17].
The absence of nosocomial transmission to patients in
Masindi, with the possible exception of a single trans-
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Page 12 of 17another achievement. This was again an effect of early
case detection and isolation, which prevented EHF
patients to seek care from unsuspecting HCWs in facil-
ities other than the Ebola ward. Infection control on the
Ebola ward was then sufficiently stringent to prevent
SEBOV transmission to non-cases.
The mobilisation of the local government needs was
successful. The local councils stood behind the disease
control team unwaveringly, even during adverse com-
munity reactions. The community, sub-county and dis-
trict level proved to be particularly important structures
for the support of outbreak response activities: they
liaised with the community including the index family,
organised the cooperation with other sectors (education,
environment etc.), and facilitated the collaboration
between local authorities and the various international
players.
Though the difference in CFP between patients who
were hospitalised in Masindi and those who were not is
statistically not significant, it suggests that hospital treat-
ment of EHF might be of some use for the patient - that
isolation is useful to halt an FHF epidemic is beyond
doubt [12,18].
The presence of the field laboratory in Gulu has set
a new standard for the control of major filoviral HF
outbreaks. The availability of Ebola specific laboratory
results within 24 to 48 h after blood sampling permits
taking case management decisions based on laboratory
confirmed diagnoses, while otherwise the role of the
laboratory is limited to the concurrent or retrospective
analysis of the epidemiological development. The
result of a blood sample taken just after admission
allows for the swift decision whether the patient needs
to be isolated on the “confirmed” section of the Ebola
ward, or whether he can be treated under normal con-
ditions on a general ward. It is thus possible to reduce
the risk of transmission to patients who have been iso-
lated on clinical and epidemiological grounds but are
de facto not EHF cases. A second test after clinical
improvement allows for earlier discharge from the
Ebola ward conditional on antigen clearance, thus
assuring safety for contacts of convalescent patients,
avoiding unnecessarily long stays in the isolation unit,
decreasing stress levels for the convalescent, and redu-
cing the work load for staff [19]. Clearly, to have a
field laboratory on site is helpful to the outbreak con-
trol efforts.
In the aftermath of the outbreak, the hostile attitude
towards the index family subsided and made way for
expressions of solidarity. For instance, the local group of
a service club organization donated school uniforms for
the orphans and contributed to the acquisition of a
maize mill to compensate for the loss of labour and to
help the family generating some income.
Challenges in the community
During times of crisis, the local tradition required that
m e m b e r so ft h ei n d e xf a m i l ys t a ye v e nm o r ec l o s e l y
together than they do anyway, taking food from the
same plates, and sleeping close to each other in the
same few huts at the centre of the compound rather
than living scattered over an area of approximately 4
ha as in normal times (Figure 5). This, together with
giving care to sick family members, was obviously not
conducive for infection control. For a long time, the
eldest son of the deceased head of the family refused
to comply with the response team’s advice to minimise
contact within the family, and to disperse in the var-
ious family houses instead of gathering around the
central ones. The notion of infection and transmission
was rejected, instead the son was convinced that the
family had been poisoned as immigrants by its auto-
chthonous neighbours, and advised the other family
members accordingly. The concept of poisoning is
widespread in sub-Saharan Africa, and gained plausi-
bility at this occasion by the fact that autochthonous
neighbours who lived among the index family
remained unaffected, and by the somewhat hostile
reactions the index family experienced during the out-
break because of its Kenyan roots. Its siege mentality
was probably further deepened by the sudden loss of
the elders, which was, particularly in the traditional
African context, a significant challenge to the family’s
social fabric.
Members of the response team from European, Ameri-
can, or African countries other than Uganda acted as
“trusted strangers” and go-betweens for the index family
and autochthonous neighbours. They were thus able to
prevent escalation, for instance when they discouraged
local surveillance offers from carrying out their duties
under the protection of armed guards. It is interesting to
consider the circumstances how the index family’sa t t i t u d e
eventually became more cooperative. Despite daily visits
by the outbreak response team, and considerable efforts to
persuade the index family to follow the team’s advice, the
situation only improved after the death of the eldest son,
when the family members eventually accepted to give up
their daily congregations and to stay in their individual
houses instead (Figure 5). The key intervention to change
the family’s attitude, however, was not undertaken by an
epidemiologist or anthropologist, but by the driver of the
surveillance vehicle: He held up the front page of a
national newspaper ("New Vision”, 6 Dec 2000), where the
EHF death of a popular Ugandan doctor in Gulu made the
headline “Ebola kills Dr. Lukwiya”, and told the family:
“L o o k :y o ua r en o tt h eo n l yo n e sw h oa r ea f f e c t e d ! ” It is
difficult to plan for having the right intuition in the right
moment - but flat hierarchies may help good ideas to
emerge.
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Page 13 of 17The general population of Masindi district, even at a
considerable distance from the index family, was frigh-
tened. Panic reactions occurred, when a stampede was
triggered by the rumour that an EHF patient wandered
the hospital grounds: “100 patients flee Masindi Hospital
over Ebola fear” was the newspaper headline of the day
("New Vision”, 9 Dec 2000). Fear made it very difficult,
at times impossible, to recruit community volunteers for
activities like digging graves; international experts thus
had to take on this role. Fear lead to acts of sabotage,
when villagers filled in graves over night which the mili-
tary had dug in advance. Fear resulted in discrimination,
when HCWs found themselves banned from shops and
market places. Fear gave rise to aggression, when a vio-
lent demonstration protested against the presence of
EHF patients in Masindi hospital, accusing local politi-
cians to accept them for money, or when HCWs found
their house burned down after returning from work.
Fear revived rivalries between Masindi and Kiryandongo
inhabitants, when the former resented that patients
from the index family were taken to Masindi hospital
although Kiryandongo was closer by. Finally, fear alie-
nated neighbours, who had lived peacefully with each
other for decades, and locals demanded: “Those Kenyans
who brought Ebola here - send them home!”
It is very important to be mentally prepared for such
adverse community reactions, and to avoid anything
which inflames the situation further. For instance, by
the time health educators reach the villages, the com-
munity often knows already that EHF is a dangerous
disease, so there is usually little point in stressing how
dreadful and deadly it is. It is not helpful either to fal-
sely state that “there is no treatment for Ebola”, neglect-
ing the availability of supportive treatment. Such
statements discourage patients to accept isolation in the
hospital, and can frequently be found in the media or in
health education material. Instead, the community needs
to be informed how its members can protect themselves,
how EHF can be recognised in its early stage - particu-
larly, that haemorrhage is not necessarily present -, and
what to do when somebody falls ill with symptoms com-
patible with EHF. The community needs confidence
instilled, not fear.
Challenges in the health system
Recruiting public HCWs for the follow-up of contacts
was difficult for fear of contamination; working in mobi-
lisation teams in communities where transmission had
not yet occurred was more popular. Even more difficult
was the recruitment of clinical staff for work on the iso-
lation unit for fear of occupational transmission of
Ebola virus. The few HCWs who volunteered were
quickly overworked. Staff meetings were called in,
appealing to the solidarity of HCWs not to let down
their volunteering colleagues. An agreement was reached
resulting in more hospital staff working on the Ebola
ward, but only for a few days each. While this strategy
improved the situation, the resulting high turnover had
two downsides: it put a considerable burden on expatri-
ate staff for training a high number of hospital staff, and
it prevented hospital staff from accumulating experience
that would have had a positive effect on confidence and
work safety.
Fear remained a major factor among HCWs. While
more staff now agreed to work on the Ebola ward, not
all of them trusted the protective gear and dared to get
close enough to the patients for providing nursing care
and supportive treatment. Oral rehydration is seen as an
important component of supportive treatment [18].
However, when weak or confused patients lie in basic
hospital beds without back support, they depend on
others for helping them drink. Insufficient assistance for
oral rehydration may have contributed to the initially
high CFP, which with 76% was higher than what was
observed in Gulu (51%, computed from own data and
[3]) and other SEBOV outbreaks (Sudan 1976, 53% [1];
Sudan 1979, 65% [2]; Sudan 2004, 41% [6]). The much
lower CFP after reinforcement arrived (20%) may be
explained by improved quality of care, particularly
improved rehydration, due to better staffing, reduced
fear in and enhanced self-confidence in HCWs. This
explanation is in line with observations of HCWs’ prac-
tice on the ward. Alternative explanations for the differ-
ence in CFP include a lower viral load in occupational
cases and virus attenuation.
HCWs’ fears were sustained by the continuing occur-
rence of occupational transmission after the introduc-
tion of barrier-nursing. For most cases, breaches of
barrier nursing by absent-minded or careless HCWs
could be identified retrospectively. A recipe against
absent-mindedness may be the ‘buddy’ system, which
was introduced in later outbreaks, whereby each HCW
touching a patient and becoming contaminated is
accompanied by a second HCW who monitors the com-
pliance with safety procedures and warns his buddy if a
breach is imminent. Special attention should be given to
the training and supervision of nursing aides, cleaners,
drivers etc. When HCWs are careless and refuse to
heed advice, they have to be prevented from working on
the isolation ward for the safety of themselves and their
colleagues.
Health care for EHF patients collapsed towards the
end November, when the influx of patients increased
drastically (9 patients within 3 days) and deaths from
the virus increased including six HCWs and patients in
the Ebola ward. These events revived fears and even
panic among many staff members. Clinical staff stayed
away from the Ebola ward, drivers absconded, and
Borchert et al. BMC Infectious Diseases 2011, 11:357
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/11/357
Page 14 of 17community volunteers could no longer be recruited, for
digging graves (a no-risk activity) or as cleaners. When
the crisis reached its maximum, there were four dead
bodies on the Ebola ward for more than 48 h. Because
body fluids tend to leak out of corpses in abundance,
dead bodies are a significant source of contamination
and must be disinfected, put into a body bag and buried
swiftly. Furthermore, the prolonged presence of a dead
body on the isolation ward is frightening and appalling
and undermines the willingness of hospital staff to work
on the Ebola ward and of probable cases, namely among
HCWs, to accept hospitalisation. The nosocomial trans-
mission of SEBOV from mother to child likely happened
in this phase. Only the prevailing confusion can explain
why the infant was not separated from its mother suffer-
ing from EHF.
At this point, the closure of the Ebola ward in
Masindi, and the transfer of all patients to Gulu was
considered by the District Ebola response team as last
option. Fortunately, this measure was averted by the
arrival of a high-level delegation from the MoH, and of
a team from Gulu district consisting of senior interna-
tional experts and experienced local staff. The direct
interaction between high ranking MoH officials and the
Masindi hospital staff boosted morale, while the increase
in experts allowed reviving certain activities (e.g. public
mobilisation). Gulu local staff turned the tide by fear-
lessly clearing the Ebola ward of dead bodies, thus act-
ing as role models. With the approval of MoH the
District Government paid out special allowances to
attract and retain HCWs and volunteers involved in the
Ebola response. Local hospital staff volunteered again to
work on the Ebola ward and agreed to work there long
enough to gather sufficient experience, and community
members approached the response team asking whether
they could join in the effort.
In retrospect it became apparent that the follow-up of
contacts was not as comprehensive as it should have
been. Patients who had been discharged from the ‘prob-
able’ section of the Ebola ward as non-cases as well as
staff working on the Ebola ward were not followed up
systematically. In future outbreaks, the possibility of
nosocomial and occupational transmission on the Ebola
ward should be taken into account when establishing
lists of contacts for follow-up.
For the VHF field laboratory to be fully supportive to
the control efforts there must be an appropriate strategy
for sampling, testing and communicating results. Isola-
tion must not be delayed until the diagnosis has been
laboratory confirmed for any length of time, as this
would put contacts of probable cases at risk of transmis-
sion. Instead, probable cases must be isolated on clinical
and epidemiological grounds alone, possibly in a holding
area outside the isolation ward if that is more acceptable
to patients. Given that the isolation ward is a very frigh-
tening place for most, probable cases who know that
laboratory results will be available in a few days, notably
HCWs who are probable cases themselves, may refuse
isolation without laboratory confirmation. HCWs who
decide on isolation may be less inclined to insist if the
probable case is one of their colleagues. This occurred
repeatedly during the Masindi outbreak, and at least one
case of occupational Ebola infection occurred at Kiryan-
dongo Hospital due to the delayed transfer of a probable
case to the Ebola ward.
Antigen capture ELISA and PCR were the main tests
to confirm current infection. At the time, the latter was
believed to become positive one or two days earlier than
the ELISA, which would be an obvious advantage to
reduce in-hospital transmission between patients. On
the other hand, positive PCR results repeatedly turned
out to be false. This created considerable and unneces-
sary anxiety in the patients and put them at avoidable
risk for in-hospital transmission. Specificity of PCR
needed further improvement if the method was to
become an essential tool for a BSL 4 field laboratory.
Five years later, PCR was the dominant test during the
Marburg HF outbreak in Uige/Angola [20].
The communication of laboratory results was proble-
matic in two ways. Firstly, it was initially unclear who
was responsible and entitled to receive laboratory
results, so that conflicting information circulated, which
resulted in an unnecessary burden on laboratory staff to
respond to repeat queries. In the future, a medically
qualified individual should be identified from the begin-
ning to act as single contact person for the communica-
tion between laboratory and hospital. Secondly, oral
communication by telephone in a setting where many
family names are similar or identical and where many
team members do not share the same mother tongue
lead to several misunderstandings. This problem can be
solved by using written communication by email, trans-
mitted via telephone landlines, mobile phone networks,
satellite connection or high frequency radio
Limitations
Clinical records were not available for analysis. It was
therefore almost impossible to investigate whether varia-
tions in the quality of supportive care may explain the
striking differences in CFP between the two phases of
the outbreak response. Two explanations have been
offered for the records’ absence. Firstly, it was reported
that they were sent to Gulu to be analysed jointly with
the clinical records from there. However, colleagues in
Gulu denied having ever received them. In any case,
clinical records from Masindi Ebola ward were property
of Masindi hospitals, and should not have been
removed; instead, copies should have been sent to Gulu.
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Page 15 of 17Secondly, it has been suggested that the possibly con-
taminated records may have been destroyed at the end
of the epidemic to avoid that they could become the ori-
gin of renewed transmission, or that they are incrimi-
nated should such transmission occur from other
origins. The risk that dry paper acts as fomite for the
transmission of filovirus appears to be small given their
susceptibility to drought and sunlight [21], but experi-
ments could provide valuable data on viral survival rates
on paper. Ultimately, guidelines on handling clinical
records from Ebola wards should be agreed by the
major players and approved by WHO to avoid unneces-
sary loss of data urgently needed to assess the effective-
ness of treatment regimes for filoviral infections.
Conclusions
In many ways, the response to the EHF outbreak in
Masindi should have been straightforward: the number
of cases was limited, all transmissions occurred in a
controlled environment, a functioning hospital where an
isolation ward could be set up was available and a FHF
field laboratory within reach, and transport, communica-
tion and security were not particularly challenging com-
pared with many other settings where FHF outbreaks
have occurred. And yet, because of fear and resulting
adverse reactions from local communities and HCWs,
the response proved most challenging. This underlines
once more the fundamental importance of establishing a
relationship of trust and confidence with the families
concerned, the community at large and local HCWs -
such relationship is actually a necessary condition for a
successful response [14]. Information management, i.e.
providing authoritative information through a single and
easily available source, is crucial in the prevention of
perilous rumours.
Since the first occurrence of FHF outbreaks in their
natural environment in 1976, a vast amount of knowl-
edge has been accumulated on how such outbreaks
should be investigated and responded to. However, a
painful gap persists until today: how best to treat FHF
disease. The EHF outbreak in Masindi was another
missed opportunity in this respect: all clinical records
were lost or destroyed. Thus, we can only suggest, based
on observations, that intense supportive treatment may
improve survival. The dearth of clinical data has reached
a stage where the failure to contribute to our under-
standing of best clinical practice should be considered
as unethical. We urgently need a consensus on which
clinical data ought to be documented, and how [22].
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